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NOTE
APPROPRIATE FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADMITTING COMPUTER PRINTOUTS
INTO EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Few mechanical devices have had so powerful an impact on Ameri-
can society as the computer.- This impact has, however, produced
mixed results: for example, while the computer offers the prospect of
a "cashless, checkless" society,2 it simultaneously threatens individual
1. There are two basic types of computers, analog and digital. An analog com-
puter operates by measuring; a digital computer operates by counting. Most computers
in use today are digital computers. A computer that combines features of both types
is known as a hybrid computer. Annot., 16 Ai. Jun. PROOF OF FACTS 273, 276 (1965);
Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. Cm. L. REv.
254, 254 (1974); Tapper, Evidence from Computers, 8 GA. L. REv. 562, 562 n.1. See
generally Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, 6 PRAc. LAw., Nov.
1960, at 15. When used in this Note, the term computer refers to a digital computer.
The potential uses of the computer seem almost unlimited. See, e.g., United States v.
Matzker, 473 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1973) (Matthes, C.J.) (computer embosses 17,000
credit cards a day); Ege, Electronic Funds Transfer: A Survey of Problems and Pros-
pects in 1975, 35 Mb. L. REv. 1 (1975) (supermarket sales conducted by computer);
Meier & Duke, Gaming Simulation for Urban Planning, 32 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 3
(1966) (city planning by computer). In fact, one commentator claims that the com-
puter has the potential for self-replication. Bernstein, When the Computer Procreates,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 9. Legal scholars have noted that its
impact on the law will undoubtedly be substantial. See Freed, Machine Data Processing
Systems for the Trial Lavyer, 6 PRAc. LAw., Apr. 1960, at 73 (description of a punched
card technique for managing trial evidence in large cases); Garland, Computers and the
Legal Profession, 1 HoFsTRA L. REV. 43 (1973) (discussion of the potential effects of
computers on law schools, law practice, and legislative and judicial operations). See
generally Brown, Electronic Brain and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computers
Collision Course with Law, 71 YALE L.J. 239 (1961); Freed, Computer Technology and
Trial Technique, TRIAL LAw. GUmE 113 (1962); Note, Automation and the Law:
Challenge to the Attorney, 21 VAND. L. REV. 228 (1968).
2. For a discussion of some of the legal problems presented by the "cashless, check-
less" society, see Dunne, The Checkless Society and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAw. 127
(1968); Stiefel, A Checkless Society or an Unchecked Society, 19 CozMpuTERS & AuTo-
MAuTION 32 (1970).
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privacy.3 Although the computer was invented in the early 1950's, 4
its use in private industry and government has grown so explosively
that by 1975 approximately 85,000 systems were in operation in the
United States.0 Because many computers are being used to maintain
business records, 7 parties are increasingly offering and courts are ad-
mitting into evidence,' computer printouts9-the only permanent, leg-
3. The threat that computers pose to privacy is discussed in A. MILLER, THE As-
SAULT ON PRIVAcY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS (1972); A. WESTIN & M.
BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY (1972); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
(1970); Countryman, The Diminishing Right to Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the
Computer, 49 TEx. L REV. 837 (1971); Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age:
The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICiH. L.
REv. 1089 (1969).
4. The first commercially produced computer, Univac I, was delivered to the
United States Bureau of the Census in 1951. Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 271 (N.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, re-
manded in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Freed,
Evidence and Problems of Proof in a Computerized Society, 1 MoD. UsES Loaic L.,
Dec. 1963, at 171, 180-81; Comment, Computer Print-Outs of Business Records and
Their Admissibility in New York, 31 ALB. L. REv. 61, 68 (1967). The first Interna-
tional Business Machines (IBM) computer was completed in April 1953, and was in-
tended primarily for scientific work in connection with nuclear research. The com-
pany's first commercial computer, the IBM 702, was installed in early 1955. Telex
Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., supra, at 270. See generally H. GOLD-
STINE, THE COMfn.PUTER FROM PASCAL TO VON NEUMANN (1972).
5. In 1952 the federal government owned 2 computers, but by 1971 had purchased
5,961 computers. It is said that the federal government now owns over 7,000 computers.
See GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, INVENTORY OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
EQUIPMENT IN THE U.S.A., FISCAL YEAR 1971, at 15A, cited in Roberts, supra note 1,
at 254.
6. Note, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
1033, 1033 (1970). The effect of such prodigious growth has been that computers in
use today vary tremendously in statistical power. For example, the IBM 370/168 when
compared to Univac I has 700 times the storage capacity; adds 4,300 times faster; mul-
tiplies 3,100 times quicker; and divides 2,000 times faster. Current tape drives transfer
data 40 times faster than the tape drives in Univac I. Telex Corp. v. International Busi-
ness Machs. Corp., 376 F. Supp. 258, 273 (N.D. Okla. 1973). aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, remanded in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismi'ssed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
There are still computers in use that were developed in the 1950's, and therefore are
unsophisticated in both design and capability. Mills, Lincoln & Langhead, Computer
Output-Its Admissibility into Evidence, 3 LAw & CoMPuTER TECH. 14, 15 (1970).
7. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1239 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974). It has been argued that "business records will probably be the most
common source of computer-generated evidence." Roberts, supra note 1, at 255. See
also Note, supra note 1, at 230-37.
8. See cases cited note 43 infia.
9. The correct spelling of the word is printout. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1145 (1967); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OF-
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ible presentation of the information.'0
Since a computer printout is a hearsay statement,11 the rule against
hearsay will prevent its introduction into evidence unless it can qualify
under an exception.' 2 This Note will consider the appropriate founda-
tion requirements for admitting computer printouts into evidence under
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Section II will dis-
cuss the hearsay rule and the traditional foundation requirements for
both the common law and the statutory business records exception.
Section III will describe how a computer operates and maintains records;
this section will conclude with a comparison of manual and computer
recordkeeping systems. Section IV will investigate the conceptual
problems of applying the statutory and common law foundation re-
quirements to the admission of computer printouts and review the rele-
vant case law. Section V will suggest a model statute that the states
and the federal government might enact to regulate the admission of
computer printouts into evidence.
FICE STYLE MANuALI 111 (rev. ed. 1973). Courts spell it in a number of ways. Com-
pare King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1969)
(print-out), with Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir.
1969) (per curiam) (printout).
10. A computer printout is "a writing which contains in human readable form the
contents of a machine readable medium, such as disk, magnetic tape, or drum and is
the only permanent, legible form of the results." Elmaleh, Evidentiary Concepts in a
Computerized Society, 5 COMPUTER L. SERNV. 1, 6 n.10 (1972).
11. See note 21 infra.
12. See notes 37-74 infra and accompanying text. The introduction of computer
printouts into evidence raises numerous other evidentiary problems such as application
of the best evidence rule and issues arising during discovery. For a discussion of the
best evidence rule and computer printouts, see Freightliner Corp. v. Gyles, 268 Ore. 357,
521 P.2d 1 (1974) (witness' testimony concerning contents of computer printouts held
inadmissible because the printouts were the best evidence); Harned v. Credit Bureau of
Gillette, 513 P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1973) (computer printouts held inadmissible because not
best evidence), discussed in Roberts, supra note 1, at 278; Freed, supra note 4, at 182;
Johnson, Electronic Data Processing and the Judge Advocate, 44 MIL. L. REv. 1, 18-
20 (1969); Note, supra note 6, at 1042-44; Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Compu'er
Print-Outs, 52 N.C. L. REv. 903, 904 (1974); Note, Evidence: The Admissibility of
Computer Print-Outs in Kansas, 8 WASHB RN L.J. 330, 332-34 (1969). For a discus-
sion of the problems computer printouts raise in discovery, see United States v. Liebert,
519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975) (IRS lists held not discover-
able for impeaching the reliability of IRS computers when defendant offered alternative
information); BOARD OF EDrrORS FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX AND MuL-rlis-rcT LmGATION § 2.615, at 77-80 (rev. ed. May 18, 1970); Ber-
nacchi & Larsen, Philosophy, Data Processing, and the Rules of Evidence, 48 L.A. B.
BULL. 374, 375 (1973); Johnson, supra, at 19; Comment, supra note 4, at 71.
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This Note will argue that the traditional foundation requirements of
the business records exception to the hearsay rule are ineffective to
ensure the reliability of a computer printout. A review of the case law
suggests that the courts have failed to recognize this problem and con-
sequently have not developed an adequate test. Therefore, this Note
will conclude by proposing a model statute with tailored foundation re-
quirements for admitting computer printouts into evidence.
HI. THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY AN) THE
BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION
A. The Rule Against Hearsay
Professor Wigmore calls the rule against hearsay "that most charac-
teristic rule of the Anglo-American Law of Evidence-a rule which may
be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contribution of that emi-
nently practical legal system to the world's methods of procedure."' 3
The rule barring hearsay evidence is firmly established,.4 although the
exceptions have "virtually swallowed the rule.""; Professor Wigmore
13. 5 J. WGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AmERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRILs AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 28 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1974) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE]. For the most complete history of the hearsay rule, see 5 WIOMORE
§ 1364. There is a shorter history in C. McCoRmcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 224 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMIcK], and in
J. TuAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW chs. 2-4
(1898). For valuable discussions of the rule against hearsay, see Ladd, The Relation-
ship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18
MINN. L. REv. 506 (1934); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE LJ. 489
(1930); Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HRAv.
L. Rav. 712 (1927). The issue of hearsay is not confined to the law. See, e.g., H.
LONGFELLOW, EVANGELINE, Bk. 2, ch. 1, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF LONG-
FELLOW (Riverside ed. 1972) ("Sometimes a rumour, a hearsay ... came."); P. SIDNEY,
ARcAIA, Bk. 1, ch. 10, at 129, in 2 TRE COMPLETE WORKS OF Sm PHILIP SIDNEY (A.
Grosart 1877) ("[those] whose metall stiff he knew he could not bond with hear-
say pictures"); A. TENNYSON, VrViEN 800, in TuE POEMS OF TENNYSON (C. Ricks
1969) ("She blamed herself for telling hearsay tales.").
14. 2 B. JoNEs, Tim LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVI AND CRIMINAL § 8:1, at 161 (S.
Gard 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES]. One commentator has pointed out that de-
spite the lack of agreement on what is hearsay, there is a consensus that it is bad. M.
LADD, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON EvIDENcE 380 (2d ed. 1955). But cf. Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HAtv. L. REv. 177, 219
(1948) ("Classification of evidence as hearsay ... should not result in its automatic
exclusion.").
15. De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 894 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
"[Clourts and legislatures, most particularly in these United States, have over the years
made up many rules for excluding from trials a great deal of relevant evidence." J.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/9
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and Dean McCormick's definitions are the most accepted and well-
known of the numerous attempts to define hearsay. 6 Reflecting his
emphasis on the importance of cross-examination, Professor Wigmore
maintains that hearsay signifies "a rule rejecting assertions, offered tes-
timonially, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of
cross-examination.' 7  Dean McCormick's definition, adopted by the
Federal Rules of Evidence,' 8 is "testimony in court, or written evidence,
of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an asser-
tion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resisting for
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."'19 Under
either definition a written statement may be hearsay, 20 so that a com-
puter printout, if "offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, " " is a hearsay statement.
MAGuntE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 10 (1947). See notes 37-39
infra and accompanying text.
16. Commentators and draftsmen have proposed numerous definitions of hearsay.
Some examples are:
a) R. CRoss & N. WE.mN s, AN OUTLmNE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 90 (1964):
Express or implied assertions of persons, other than a witness who is testifying
and assertions in documents produced to the court when no witness is testify-
ing, are inadmissible as evidence of the truth of that which was asserted.
b) UNIORM RULE OF EviDEN E 801 (1964):
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.
c) Maguire proposed a definition that was over a page in length. See Maguire, The
Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741, 768-69
(1961).
17. 5 WirMOpE, supra note 13, § 1362, at 3. Professor Wigmore devotes almost
250 pages of his study of evidence to a discussion of the rationale for the hearsay rule.
See id. § 1360-1427.
18. FED. R. Evm. 801(c) provides:
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matters
asserted.
19. McCo.MIcy, supra note 13, § 246, at 584 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Dean McCormick states that the definition "seeks to limit the term 'hearsay' to situa-
tions where the out-of-court assertion is offered as equivalent to testimony to the facts
so asserted by a witness on the stand." Id. at 585.
20. 2 JoNEs, supra note 14, § 8:2, at 165; McCoRMiCK, supra note 13, § 245. See
UNoIFOn RuLE OF EVIDENCE 801(a) (1974) (defining statement as "an oral or written
assertion . . . "). See generally 5 WaMoR.E, supra note 13, H8 1361-1362. In fact,
"[a] hearsay statement is not necessarily confined to words, written or spoken, but may
very well consist of conduct . . ." JONES, supra note 14, § 8:1, at 165. The leading
case standing for this proposition is Wright v. Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (1838), dis-
cussed extensively in Maguire, supra note 16.
21. If the printout were not offered to "show the truth of matters asserted therein,"
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In Mima Queen v. Hepburn,22 Chief Justice Marshall stated that the
"inherent weakness" of hearsay is the basis for excluding it from evi-
dence.23 Employing a more reasoned approach, commentators have
reached the same conclusion24 and isolated three factors to determine
the credibility of a witness' testimony: perception, memory, and nar-
ration of the witness. 25 Based on these elements, courts have devised
three requirements for a witness to testify: oath, personal presence, and
cross-examination.25
The oath is important both as a symbol of the gravity of testifying
in a judicial proceeding and as a reminder of the threat of punishment
for perjury.27 Personal presence is necessary for the trier of fact to
observe the witness testifying in court.28  This requirement is waived
see note 18 supra and accompanying text, it would not be a hearsay statement and there-
fore not excluded by the rule against hearsay. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 246, at
584; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, §§ 1361-1362. See also UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
801 (1974), quoted in note 16 supra; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 501, 502 (1942).
Accord, Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust, 285 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir.
1960); Carantzas v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1956).
22. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813).
23. In discussing the value of hearsay, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "['H]earsay
evidence' is in its own nature inadmissible . . . ." Its intrinsic weakness, its incom-
petency to satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be
practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is totally
inadmissible. Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added). Accord, Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 412, 436 (1836) (Story, J.). But see Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Computer
Print-Outs, supra note 12, at 955.
24. See McCoRMcIC, supra note 13, § 245; 5 WiGMoRE, supra note 13, § 1362. See
also 5 WiGMORE, supra note 13, §§ 1367-1368; Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 85 U. PA.
L. REV. 484 (1937). Some commentators add sincerity as a fourth element, see, e.g.,
Morgan, supra note 14, at 185-88, but the better view is that it is merely a variation of
the other three factors. McCoRMICK, supra note 13, § 245.
26. 2 JONES, supra note 14, § 8:2, at 166; McCoRMICK, supra note 13, § 245.
27. McCoRMICK, supra note 13, § 245. See Rossville Salvage Corp. v. S. E.
Graham Co., 319 F.2d 391, 396 (3d Cir. 1963). It is, however, generally acknowledged
today that the value of the oath is negligible. 2 JONES, supra note 14, § 8:2, at 166
("But the absence of the oath is really mostly an incidental factor . . . ."); Morgan,
supra note 14, at 182. Professor Wigmore claims that the oath is merely an incidental
feature accompanying cross-examination. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1362, at 10.
For a general, but dated, discussion of the oath, see White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings
and Their Effect upon the Competency of Witnesses, 42 Am. L. Ro. (N.S.) 373
(1903).
28. United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (N.D. Ind.
1961); Robertson v. Heath, 132 Ga. 310, 312-13, 64 S:E. 73, 74 (1909); MCCORMICK,
supra note 13, § 245; Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions,
85 U. PA. L. REv. 484, 500-02 (1937). But see 2 JoNns, supra note 14, § 8:2, at
166.
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for a written statement, which may be examined for reliability when
offered into evidence. Cross-examination is the most vital requirement.29
Professor Wigmore believed that cross-examination is "beyond any doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"3 so
that "no statement . . . should be used as testimony until it has been
probed and sublimated by that test . . . ."I' Although Professor Wig-
more's faith in its value may be excessive, cross-examination can be a
valuable legal tool when properly exercised. 2 Its purpose is to probe for
the truth by eliciting undisclosed circumstances and by exposing "inac-
curacies and falsehoods."' 3
The value of hearsay evidence is as uneven as that of any other evi-
dence. The numerous exceptions3" to the rule against hearsay are
proof that courts and legislatures do not firmly believe in its "inherent
weakness.""; Application of the rule and its exceptions has so engaged
the courts' attention, however, that they have not had the opportunity
to review its validity under modem social conditions.3"
B. The Business Records Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay
1. Early History of the Business Records Exception
Rigid application of the hearsay rule would often result in the ex-
clusion of necessary, reliable evidence. 7  Consequently, courts have
created exceptions to the rule when there is reasonable justification for
29. 2 JONES, supra note 14, § 8:2, at 166; McCoRmIcK, supra note 13, § 245; 5
WiGMOm, supra note 13, §§ 1367-1372; Morgan, supra note 13, at 712. But see Stra-
horn, supra note 28, at 500-02.
30. 5 WIO~ORE, supra note 13, § 1367, at 32.
31. Id.
32. Rossville Salvage Corp. v. S. E. Graham Co., 319 F.2d 391, 396 (3d Cir.
1963); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Pettus v. Casey, 358 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. 1962); J. MAGLumrE, supra note 15, at 13. Cf.
Morgan, supra note 14, at 188 ("'[lf a witness is willing to commit perjury and counsel
is willing to co-operate . . . cross-examination will [not] be of much avail to expose
the willful falsehood unless either witness or counsel is unusually stupid.").
33. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1367, at 33.
34. See notes 37-39 infra and accompanying text.
35. Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813). See also authorities
cited note 24 supra.
36. 1. MAGurRE, supra note 15, at 10.
37. Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs, supra note 12, at 905.
See Note, Business Records Rule, Repeated Target of Legal Reform, 36 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 241 (1970); 31 MoD. L. REV. 668 (1968) ("In a modern sophisticated age it is
highly doubtful whether we need rules of evidence at all.").
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admitting otherwise unacceptable evidence. 88 Two principles form the
basis for the exceptions to the hearsay rule: necessity and a circum-
stantial probability that the evidence is reliable." When these two
considerations are present, courts have been willing to dispense with
the test of cross-examination and admit hearsay evidence.
A computer printout is a hearsay statement,40 but may be admissible
under one of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay. For example,
if a printout were produced by a party to the action, a court could allow
it into evidence against him as an admission .4  A printout could fall
within the exception for a record of past recollection if the testifying
witness caused it to be made and verifies its accuracy. 2 Most parties,
however, attempt to introduce the printout under the business records
exception."
The present business records exception is the product of two histori-
cal rules of evidence, 44 the shopbook rule415 and the regular entries
38. 5 WMoRB, supra note 13, § 1420. Some exceptions to the rule against hearsay
are declarations against interest, see Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Ex-
ception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Hv. L. Rnv. 1 (1944); dying declarations, see Quick,
Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L. Rnv. 109 (1960); books, treatises,
and other professional literature, see Note, Learned Treatises, 46 IowA L. REv. 463
(1961); and records of past recollection, see Note, Past Recollection Recorded, 28 IowA
L. REv. 530 (1943). In fact, there are so many exceptions that "[i]t is very hard in-
deed to hold clearly in mind all their varying prerequisites and limitations .... " Ma-
guire, supra note 16, at 774.
39. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1420-1422; Strahorn, supra note 28, at 502-04.
There is no general exception to the hearsay rule, and "[a] careful analysis of the de-
cisions will disclose that there is no theory that will explain all of the exceptions or
harmonize one with another. . . ." E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LmGATON 221 (1956).
40. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
41. See generally Jefferson, supra note 38; Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 30 YrE L.J. 355 (1921). At present no case has been reported in
which a party has employed this argument to have a computer printout admitted into
evidence.
42. Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IowA L. REv. 276, 278 (1961).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975) (computer
printouts held admissible under the business records exception to prove tax evasion);
United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969) (absence of entry in a com-
puterized business record admissible to prove nonoccurrence of event); King v. State ex
rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969) (computer printouts admis.
sible under business records exception to prove amount of damages); Transport Indem.
Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965) (computer printouts held admissible
as a business record exception to determine amount of claims owed on insurance policy).
44. McCoRmIcK, supra note 13, § 306, at 718-20; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13,
H9 1517-1518.
45. For a complete study of the shopbook rule and its development in the United
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Number 1] ADMITTING COMPUTER PRINTOUTS INTO EVIDENCE 67
rule."' Under the shopbook rule a tradesman's books were admissible
although the party himself was disqualified as a witness.47 After
parties were allowed to testify as witnesses, the need for the rule dis-
appeared, 8 and the regular entries rule superseded it.49 This rule was
significantly broader in scope than the shopbook rule since it also in-
cluded the records of a third party. ,0
The common law regular entries exception had five prerequisites for
an admissible record: 1) the entries were original entries; 2) the en-
tries were produced in the regular course of business; 3) the entries
were posted at or near the time of the transaction recorded; 4) the en-
tries were made with the personal knowledge of the recorder or the
person(s) reporting to him; and, 5) the recorder or his informer(s)
was unavailable.Y1  If these requirements were satisfied, the business
record was considered reliable, and the court would admit it into evi-
dence.,"
States, see Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Ore. 559, 210 P. 863 (1922), noted in 3 ORE. L. REv.
154 (1923). The Supreme Court of Oregon devoted 27 pages of its opinion to an an-
alysis of the cases and commentaries which revealed significant confusion about the rule.
See also J. McKELvY, HANDBOOK OF THF LAW OF EVIDENCE 442-60 (5th ed. 1944).
46. For a discussion of the development of the regular entries rule, see 5 WiGMoRE,
supra note 13, § 1518; Norville, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 27
ORE. L. Rnv. 188, 191-95 (1948); Polasky & Paulson, Business Entries, 4 UTAH L. R-v.
327, 334-38 (1955).
47. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 305; Laughlin, supra note 42, at 278.
48. Whittier, Account Books in California, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 272 (1926).
49. McCoPw. Ic , supra note 13, § 305. See also Kinnare, Account Books as Evi-
dence in Illinois, 11 Cml.-KENT L. REv. 278, 284 (1933); Whittier, supra note 48, at
272.
50. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1518, at 350-51.
51. The only significant distinction between the foundation requirements of the
shopbook rule and the regular entries rule is that the latter demands that the person
making the entries or his informer(s) not be available. Laughlin, supra note 42, at 283.
Recognizing the practical impossibility of this requirement under modem business con-
ditions, some courts were willing to relax this requirement. Thus, when the records were
bulky and the testimony of every person who handled the record would be pointless,
courts waived the requirement. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich
Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, J.) (32,000 sales orders
admitted into evidence on verification of single clerk without calling all other clerks);
French v. Virginia Ry., 212 Va. 383, 93 S.E. 585 (1917) (train dispatcher's record of
train movement admissible on testimony of the claim dispatcher who had access to re-
cord); State v. Lare, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S.E. 116 (1925) (business record admitted
into evidence without testimony of the recorder and his informers because inconvenience
of calling witnesses outweighed probable utility). Another requirement infrequently ap-
plied was that there be no motive to misrepresent. 5 WiGMORE, supra note 13, § 1527.
52. See, e.g., People v. Small, 319 IM. 437, 150 N.E. 435 (1926); Smith v. Sulivan,
58 Mont. 77, 190 P. 288 (1920).Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. The Statutory Solutions
The confusion caused by the courts' disparate treatment of the regu-
lar entries rule53 and a feeling that the exception should be broadened
led to two major efforts to draft uniform legislation revising the provi-
sions of the exception. 4 In 1927, the Commonwealth Fund of New
York proposed a model act for "Proof of Business Transactions"5
which was adopted by the federal government 5 and some states."7
Nine years later the National Conference of Commissioners on State
Laws, using the earlier act as a model," formulated the Uniform Busi-
53. Norville, supra note 46, at 195-96 (Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Nor-
wich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, J.)); E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Tomlinson, 296 F. 634 (4th Cir. 1924); Bracken v. Dillon, 64 Ga.
243 (1879); Fiedler v. Collier, 13 Ga. 496 (1853); Givens v. Pierson, 167 Ky. 574, 181
S.W. 324 (1916). See also Polasky & Paulson, supra note 46, at 340.
54. The common law regular entries rule had become so unwieldy that it provoked
this comment from Judge Cardozo: "Some of its rules are so unwieldy that many of
the simplest things of life, transactions so common as the sale and delivery of merchan-
dise, are often the most difficult to prove." Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV.
L. REv. 113, 121-22 (1921). Professor Wigmore said that the rule had "developed a
mass of detailed petty limitations that had no relation to the practical trustworthiness
of the documents offered." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1561(a), at 489. See generally
E. MORGAN, Z. CHAFEE, R. GIFFORD, AND J. WIGMORE, THE LAW OF EVIDENcE: SOME
PROPOsALs FOR rrs REFORM ch. 5 (1927) [hereinafter cited as E. MORGAN et al.].
55. The Commonwealth Fund of New York had set up a special committee to re-
view rules of evidence that needed revision. Edmund Morgan was chairman of the com-
mittee, and its members included such scholars as Zachariah Chafee, Jr. and John H.
Wigmore. E. MORGAN et al., supra note 54, at viii. For an interesting history of the
evolution of the Commonwealth Fund's model act, see Morgan, Practical Difficulties Im-
peding Reformn in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REV. 725 (1961). The model act
stated:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence,
or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction, oc-
currence, or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular
course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such business to
make such memorandum or record at the time of such action, transaction, oc-
currence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circum-
stances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal
knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they
shall not affect its admissibility. The term business shall include business, pro-
fession, occupation and calling of every kind.
E. MORGAN et al., supra note 54, at 65.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Act of June 20, 1936,
ch. 640, § 1, N.Y. Stat. 1561).
57. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 415 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-771 (1974); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4518(a) (McKinney 1963), cited in Tapper, supra note 1, at 591
nn. 164 & 165.
58. Norville, supra note 46, at 197 n.57. Professor Morgan felt that the Uniformhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/9
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ness Records as Evidence Act (UBREA)19 which has enjoyed wide-
spread acceptance.0 Numerous other model statutory formulations
have subsequently been proposed,,' one of which provides for computer
Business Records as Evidence Act (UBREA) was somewhat more flexible than the
Commonwealth Fund's model act. Morgan, supra note 55, at 727.
59. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act provides:
An Act to make uniform the use of business records as evidence:
Section 1. (Definition.) The term 'business' shall include every kind of
business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions, whether
carried on for profit or not.
Section 2. (Business Records.) A record of an act, condition or event
shall, in so far as relevant, by competent evidence if the custodian or other
qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and
if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the
act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the Court, the sources of infor-
mation, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
Section 3. (Uniformity of Interpretation.) This Act shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it.
Section 4. (Short Title.) This Act may be cited as the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act.
UNIFORM BUSINESS REcoRDs AS EVIDENCE ACT (superseded by FED. R. Evm. 803(6),
cited in 9A UNIFORi LAWS ANNOTATED 504, 506 (1965).
60. The following jurisdictions have adopted UBREA: Arizona, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wyoming. UNiFonx RULE OF EVMENCE 303, Histor-
ical Note (1974).
61. In 1937, Roscoe L. Barrow offered another model statute:
Section 1. (Definitions.) The term 'business' shall include the operation of
institutions, every kind of profession, occupation, or calling, whether or not car-
ried on for profit. The term 'record' shall include any writing or record,
whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memoran-
dum or record of any act, transaction, condition, occurrence, or event, includ-
ing any transfer of cash. The term 'record' shall include the records made by
or for a party to the suit, and the records made by or for any third person
not a party to the suit.
Section 2. Any record shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if
any person who is familiar with the regular course of the business, even though
a party or interested person, testifies to its identity, the mode of its preparation,
and that it appears that the record was made in the regular course of the busi-
ness at or near the time of the act, transaction, condition, occurrence, or event.
All other circumstances of the making of such record, including lack of per-
sonal knowledge of the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight,
but they shall not affect its admissibility.
Section 3. Any record of a deceased person shall, in so far as relevant, be
competent evidence if the personal representative of such deceased person shall
testify that such record was found in the effects of the deceased, that the record
is the same as at the time such record was found in the effects of the deceased,
and that, in the knowledge of such personal representative, there are no wit-
nesses capable of testifying to the identity of such record, the mode of its prep-
aration, and that such record was made in the regular course of the businessWashington University Open Scholarship
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at or near the time of the act, transaction, condition, occurrence, or event.
The personal representative shall testify that he has no knowledge or informa-
tion indicating that the record was not made in the regular course of business
at or near the time of the act, transaction, condition, occurrence, or event.
Section 4. The absence of an entry regarding any act, transaction, condition,
occurrence, or event in any record where it would have regularly been recorded
had it taken place, shall be received as competent evidence that no such act,
transaction, condition, occurrence, or event did take place.
Note, Business Entries Before the Court, 32 ILL. L. REv. 334, 352 (1937).
In 1942, The American Law Institute published its Model Code which contained a
suggested provision for a business records exception:
A writing offered as a memorandum or record of an act, event or condition
is admissible as tending to prove the occurrence of the act or event or the exist-
ence of the condition if the judge finds that it was made in the regular course
of business and that it was the regular course of that business for one with
personal knowledge of such an act, event or condition to make such a memo-
randum or record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such a
memorandum or record, and for the memorandum or record to be made at or
about the time of the act, event or condition or within a reasonable time there-
after.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 514 (1942).
In 1951, Professor Roy Ray suggested a proposal which was later substantially incor-
porated in Texas as TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 55, § 3737e (Vernon) (Supp. 1973):
(A) A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall, in so far
as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or event
or the existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(1) It was made in the regular course of business
(2) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or rep-
resentative of such business with personal knowledge of such act,
event or condition to make such memorandum or record or to
transmit information thereof to be included in such memorandum
or record
(3) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition
or reasonably soon thereafter.
(B) The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum or record in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) may be proved by the
testimony of the entrant, custodian or other qualified witness even
though he may not have personal knowledge as to the various items or
contents of such memorandum or record. Such lack of personal knowl-
edge may be shown to affect the weight and credibility of the memoran-
dum or record but shall not affect its admissibility.
(C) Evidence to the effect that the records of a business do not contain any
memorandum or record of an alleged act, event or condition shall be
competent to prove the non-occurrence of the act, or event or the non-
existence of the condition in that business if the judge finds that:
It was the regular course of that business to make such memoranda
or records of all such acts, events or conditions at the time or
within reasonable time thereafter and to preserve them.
(D) 'Business' as used in this rule includes any and every kind of regular or-
ganized activity whether conducted for profit or not.
Ray, Business Records-A Proposed Rule of Admissibility, 5 Sw. L.I. 33, 41-42 (1951).
In 1965, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also
proposed a model statute which makes admissible
writings offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to
prove the facts stated therein, if the judge finds that they were made in the reg-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/9
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printouts.62
Despite slight variations in their language and requirements, 3 the
effect of these statutes has been to relax the common law requirements
by removing the demand that the recorder and his informer(s) testify
if available."4 With the growth of the modem corporation this require-
ment had acted as an impediment to the admission of regularly kept
records." With minor exceptions the new statutes require only that
ular course of a business at or about the time of the act, condition or event
recorded, and that the sources of information from which they were made and
the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate
their trustworthiness.
UNn oni RuLEs OF EVmENCE 63(13) (1965), cited in 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13,
§ 1561(a), at 492 n.5.
62. The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically provide for the admissibility of "data
compilations":
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of
a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data com-
pilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified wit-
ness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of prep-
aration indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 'business' as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. Evm. 803(6) (emphasis added). See notes 184-94 infra and accompanying
text.
63. For the language of the various acts, see notes 55, 59, 61, 62 supra. Laughlin
actually gives a comparative breakdown of the language of UBREA, the Model Code
of Evidence, and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Laughlin, supra note 42, at 283-84.
64. United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. De
Georgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969); Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253,
132 N.W.2d 871 (1965). In Higgins v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68
N.W.2d 170 (1955), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the purpose of that state's
statute (Nebraska had enacted UBREA) was
to permit admission of systematically entered records without the necessity of
identifying, locating, and producing as witnesses the individuals who made en-
tries in the records in the regular course of business rather than to make a
fundamental change in the established principles of the shop-book exception to
the hearsay rule.
Id. at 557, 68 N.W.2d at 176 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Mills, Lincoln & Langhead,
supra note 6, at 201. See McCoRpncK, supra note 13, § 311.
65. In describing the causes for changes in the rule Professor Wigmore stated: "The
merchant and the manufacturer must not be turned away remediless because methods
in which the entire community places a just confidence are a little difficult to reconcile
with technical judicial scruples .... ." 5 WIGmom, supra note 13, § 1530, at 452.
Much of the impetus for legislatures enacting statutes to amend the common law reg-
ular entries rule was the study done by E. Iorgan and others which showed the imprac-
ticality of the old rule under modem business conditions. See E. MORGAN et al., supraWashington University Open Scholarship
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the transaction 1) occur in the regular course of business and 2) be
recorded in the regular course of business at or near the time of its
occurrence.
66
The regular course of business requirement may be separated into
two elements, regularity and business. 67 Regularity is the heart of the
regular entries exception: occasional memoranda and infrequent re-
ports do not fall within the exception. 8 The business requirement
does not limit admissible items to records maintained by commercial
enterprises, but has been broadly interpreted to include, for example,
hospital69 and private financial records.70 Courts have also liberally in-
terpreted the requirement that the entry be recorded at or near the
time of the transaction so long as the time span is not so lengthy that
it endangers accuracy.71
The statutes rest on the assumption that these requirements, when
combined with the business' reliance upon the records, are sufficient
to ensure the trustworthiness of the records." At the same time, neces-
sity demands that modem businesses be able to introduce their records
note 54, at 54-63; notes 54 & 55 supra. See also Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927) (Learned Hand, J.).
66. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 308-310; Roberts, supra note 1, at 273. See gen-
erally Laughlin, supra note 42, at 283-99; Norville, supra note 46, at 196-201.
67. Laughlin, supra note 42, at 286.
68. Id. at 287. See Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958); 2 JoNEs, supra note 14, § 12:8, at 347.
69. See Urn v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 567 (1940); Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224
(1938); Medina, Current Developments in Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in the New
York Courts, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 449, 454-58 (1945). But see New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See generally McCormick, The Use of Hos-
pital Records as Evidence, 26 TUL. L. REv. 371 (1952).
70. McCoRMscK, supra note 13, § 308; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1523, at 444.
See Norville, supra note 46, at 219 n.148 (giving extensive listing of private records ad-
mitted into evidence).
71. 2 JONES, supra note 14, § 12:9, at 350 ("A resonable construction is given to
this requirement; exact contemporaneity is not exacted by the courts . . . ."); McCoR-
mIcK, supra note 13, § 309. See Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958) (record admitted despite entries being made
several months after transaction); Stanley v. Wickam, 112 Kan. 628, 211 P. 1117
(1923) (record admitted despite 30 day delay between time of event and time of record-
ing).
72. 5 WIGMoRn, supra note 13, § 1522; Polasky & Paulson, supra note 46, at 330-
33. See also Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 35, 125 S.E.2d 326,
329 (1962), in which the court stated: "Modern business and professional activities
have become so complex, involving so many persons each parforming a different
function that an accurate daily record of each transaction is required in order to prevent
utter confusion." See also Comment, Admissibility of Computer Business Records ashttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/9
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into evidence to prove their causes of action.73 Consequently, the
statutory business records exception satisfies the two policy consider-
ations justifying an exception to the rule against hearsay.74  It is ques-
tionable, however, whether these requirements are sufficient to ensure
the trustworthiness of a computer printout since it differs so radically
from a traditional business record. 7
III. THE COMPUTER
A. How the Computer Works
It is necessary to understand how a computer operates in order to
grasp the unique evidentiary problems presented by a computer print-
out. A computer is "a system of machines that processes information
in the form of letters, numbers, and other symbols . . . .,,171 Most com-
puters use a binary number system as their language because it can
translate data into machine language more easily than a decimal num-
ber system.77
A computer consists of two components known as hardware and soft-
ware.78  Software is "any program written for the computer," '79 and
an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 48 N.C. L. REv. 687, 689 (1970) (record has "a
presumed inherent trustworthiness due to internal business reliance on its accuracy").
73. Judge Learned Hand noted that "unless they [referring to business records] can
be used in court. . . nobody need ever pay a debt . . . ." Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 937 (2d Cir. 1927). See also 5 WIG-
MORE, supra note 13, § 1521.
74. McCoRMIcK, supra note 13, § 306, at 720; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, §§ 1521-
1522.
75. See notes 100-11 infra and accompanying text.
76. Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, supra note 1, at 17. A
student commentator has described the computer as "a modern miracle made of transis-
tors, tubes and diodes which are internally connected by a colored maze of wiring. It
is activated by countless buttons and switches and supplemented by machines and devices
for punching and sorting cards." Note, Evidence: The Admissibility of Computer
Print-Outs in Kansas, supra note 12, at 330. A noted judge has stated that "[tihe term
is sufficient to describe the various industrial embodiments of systems for processing in-
formation in the form of words, numbers, and other symbols." Brown, supra note 1,
at 241.
77. A binary number system consists of two digits (zero and one) and is founded
on powers of two. Roberts, supra note 1, at 256. See also Comment, Patentability:
Piecing Together the Computer Software Patent Puzzle, 19 ST. Loins U.L.J. 351, 352
(1975).
78. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 273
(N.D. OkIa. 1973), af'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); M. ABRAms & P. STEIN, COMPUTER HARD-
WARE AND SoFTARE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODucTioN 3 (1973).
79. M. ABBAMS & P. STEIN, supra note 78, at 14. For an excellent, short discussion
Washington University Open Scholarship
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may be divided into two types: systems programs that operate the
hardware and processing programs that solve users' problems. 0 De-
spitei its size and complexity, the computer's mechanical apparatus,
known as hardware, is simple, being composed of five basic elements:
input, memory, control, arithmetic, and output.8'
Input equipment translates information from readable form into in-
ternal machine language.82  This may be achieved by punched cards,88
magnetic tape, paper tape, or transparent film. Memory receives data
and instructions, and stores or produces them on demand. 84 Storage
devices can be either internal ("cores") or external such as magnetic
tape,85 disks,8 cards, or drums, all of which are detachable and give
the machine an almost limitless memory capacity.17  The control mech-
anism, known) as the central processing unit, interprets instructions
stored in memory and directs the operations of the other components.88
The arithmetic unit performs the mathematical functions.89 Some out-
put media, such as punched cards, magnetic tape, and paper tape,
merely record the results.90 Other output devices, such as the cathode
of the software industry, see Note, Patents and Computer Programs-The Supreme
Court Makes a Decision, 62 KY. L". 533, 533-35 (1974).
80. M. ABRAMS & P. STEIN, supra note 78, at 14. See also A. FELDZAmEN, TniE
INTELLIGENT MAN'S EAsY GuIDE TO COMPUTERS 97-102 (1971).
81. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 274
(N.D. Okla. 1973), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). See also Annot., supra note 1, at 280.
82. Annot., supra note 1, at 282; Note, supra note 6, at 1033.
83. For a general description of how punched cards are prepared, see G. DAVIS,
COMPUTER DATA PROCESSING chs. 1 & 2 (1969).
84. Annot., supra note 1, at 285-91. It is the memory which transforms the com-
puter from a mere mechanical calculator into a high-speed information processor.
United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1239 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); Garland, supra note 1, at 43. A computer unit recently developed for the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration has a memory that has the potential to
handle 169 billion bits of information transmitted by 25 million satellites orbiting the
world. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 7, 1976, § 2, at 11, col. 5.
85. A single reel of tape will on the average contain 15,000,000 alphabetic or
30,000,000 numeric characters. Elmaleb, supra note 10, at 4.
86. A disk file is "a storage device on which information is recorded on the
magnetizable surface of a rotating disk." Bernacchi & Larsen, supra note 12, at 376
n.6.
87. See note 84 supra.
88. Annot., supra note 1, at 291; Note, supra note 6, at 1034.
89. Annot., supra note 1, at 291-92.
90. In electronic data processing systems printing devices are nothing more than
mechanical translators. Johnson, supra note 12, at 18.
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ray tube 1 and the high-speed line printer,92 translate output into read-
able form and display it. A storage device retains output, which is
produced in the form of a printout.93
The reliability of the computer printout is the most important factor
in determining whether the record should be admitted under the busi-
ness records exception.9 4  Despite its reputation for making errors,9" a
computer is a precise machine, substantially more accurate than
people.90  In fact, humans, not machines, cause most errors.9"7  There
are three basic sources of computer mistakes: human error, mechanical
error, and deliberate falsification of the processing program or the data
base. s Selection of input data, processing of input data, and pro-
gramming are the primary causes of human errors.99 Machine errors,
91. A cathode ray tube is like a television screen and permits rapid data display for
reading by humans. A. FELDZAMrEN, supra note 80, at 257.
92. A mechanical line printer can produce output at rates up to 2,000 lines per
minute; electrostatic printers which operate in a fashion similar to xerox copiers can
produce output at even faster rates. Roberts, supra note 1, at 263.
93. The output of one computer may be transferred to another computer for further
processing without human intervention. Annot., supra note 1, at 292. See City of
Seattle v. Heath, 10 Wash. App. 949, 520 P.2d 1392 (1974) (computer in State Traffic
Violations Bureau transferred information directly to computer in State Department of
Motor Vehicles).
94. Annot., supra note 1, at 297. Reliability is one of the two policy considerations
underlying the basis of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See United
States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); text accompanying note 39 supra.
95. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (an
"Orwellian nightmare" of computer control breaking down through errors). See also
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Freed, A Lawyer's
Guide Through the Computer Maze, supra note 1, at 27. But see Awalt, Corporations,
in LAW AND CompUtERs iN THE Mim-Six-nEs 82 (R. Bigelow ed. 1966).
96. Annot., supra note 1, at 293. Lamont, Computer Installations Must be Adapted
to Tax Audit Necessities, 25 J. TAx. 302, 303 (1972).
97. Despite the great accuracy that a computer can achieve, the data fed into it by
human beings limits its reliability. Annot., supra note 1, at 298. "[H]uman participa-
tion in computer operations is a substantially greater source of inaccuracies and falli-
bility than the machine mechanism itself. . . ." Freed, A Lawyer's Guide through the
Computer Maze, supra note 1, at 25. Accord, Roberts, supra note 1, at 264 ("Each
time human intervention is required to transfer or translate data, the problem of intro-
duction of error is presented."). This has led to the maxim: "garbage in, garbage out."
See Proxmire, Out with the Garbage, 7 TRL 18, 18 (1971) (if errors are fed into the
computer, then printout will contain errors).
98. Mills, Lincoln & Langhead, supra note 6, at 17.
99. Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, supra note 1, at 25-26;
Tapper, supra note 1, at 566-67.
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although infrequent, may occur because of electrical interference or
component failure. 00
Deliberate falsification of the processing program, data base, or both
is the most serious problem affecting the reliability of the computer
printout. To some degree this danger is similar to that present in a
traditional recordkeeping system; a computer printout is, however,
more susceptible to deliberate alteration. 101 Falsification of a manual
recordkeeping system is a time-consuming process involving the physi-
cal alteration of the books by persons familiar with the accounting sys-
tem. A single person familiar with the operation of a computer can
manipulate the processing program or the data base to produce a falsi-
fied printout containing the desired information.10 2  The processing
program may be changed by erasing the tape and substituting new in-
structions, or by replacing the punched cards.' 03 In the same way, falsi-
fied input data may be fed into the computer to produce an incorrect
printout.10 4
B. Record Maintenance By Computer
Because of its speed and economy of operation, business is increas-
ingly relying on the computer for maintaining records, thereby making
traditional forms of record maintenance obsolete.'03 Employment of
a computer to keep business records results in significant differences
from traditional methods. 0 6 A traditional recordkeeping system in-
volves written records maintained by human beings. Because of the
100. Annot., supra note 1, at 297; Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer
Maze, supra note 1, at 25-26. One set of commentators argues that attorneys can antici-
pate an easier task in proving the reliability of a machine of limited capability than a
system of complex design. Mills, Lincoln & Langhead, supra note 6, at 15.
101. Annot., supra note 1, at 298-99. See Note, supra note 6, at 1035.
102. Annot., supra note 1, at 298-99.
103. Id.
104. Data is generally fed into a computer in the same manner as the programming
instructions, so that problems of the method of falsification of one are equally applicable
to the other. Annot., supra note 1, at 298; Note, supra note 6, at 1035.
105. Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, supra note 1, at 27. See
also Roberts, supra note 1, at 255. One commentator maintains that the revolution in
business recordkeeping caused by computers will begin with the larger corporations and
spread to small businesses. Lamont, supra note 96, at 302.
106. BoAIw OF EDITORS FOR THE FEDERAL JuDicIAL CENTER, supra note 12, § 2.615,
at 84-85; Tapper, supra note 1, at 566; Note, supra note 6, at 1034. But see 16 J. TAX.
373, 373 (1962).
(Vol. 1977:59
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computer's remarkable computational speed,10 7 computerized record-
keeping removes these two features of a traditional system. First,
since the computer performs a series of separate tasks as a single simul-
taneous operation, many steps previously carried out by human beings
are now performed solely by machine.10 8 Consequently, the number
of persons familiar with the recordkeeping process decreases dramati-
cally. Second, because the computations are generated and relayed by
electrical impulse, the machine produces no written records as evidence
of the process by which it derives its results. 19
Manual recordkeeping is a cumulative process involving the addition
or subtraction of new and previous entries." 0 A computerized system,
on the other hand, updates records by combining new and old entries,
destroying the latter."' This results in the loss of intermediate rec-
ords, which can be not only a valuable evidentiary aid in establishing
the reliability of the offered evidence, but also a deterrent to a party
contemplating falsification.'
Entries in a manual recordkeeping system are made close to the time
when the transaction occurs."" A business using a computer, how-
ever, will often retain its records in raw form until sufficient data has
accumulated to warrant the expense of running a program.1 4  Thus,
lengthy periods may elapse between computer runs. Also, businesses
today often contract with computer service bureaus to maintain their
records.115 When this arrangement is employed, even longer periods
may pass before the computer records the transaction.
107. See note 6 supra.
108. Because of its increased efficiency and lower operating costs, the computer has
taken over functions previously performed by humans. Tapper, supra note 1, at 565.
See also Note, supra note 6, at 1034-35.
109. The machine's processes are carried on internally, and the only legible product
is the output in printout form; a computer could record on paper or other permanent
form the intermediate steps, but this would be expensive. Note, supra note 6, at 1034-
35.
110. E. SPILLER, FINANcAL AcCOUNTING 57-61 (4th ed. 1973).
111. Freed, Evidence, in COmPuTERS AND THE LAw 139-41 (R. Bigelow 2d ed.
1969); Mills, Lincoln & Langhead, supra note 6, at 18. The computer could be in-
structed to keep the old records in memory or print them out, but this is not done.
112. For example, a manual ledger system will usually consist of 17' accounts. As
each event occurs, it is recorded in the account, and the computation retained and re-
flected in the ledger. See generally E. SPILLER, supra note 110.
113. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
114. Tapper notes that the computer may record the transaction at or near the time
of its occurrence, but not print it for "months or years." Tapper, supra note 1, at 593.
115. A service bureau is an independent company that owns or leases computers and
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The form of computerized records differs substantially from that of
traditional recordkeeping methods." 6 A manual system consists of
ledger books containing entries made by hand in readable form.1 7  A
computerized system retains the record as an electronic impulse in
memory until it is printed out or transferred to a storage medium.1 8
Since a printout is the only permanent, legible form of the record,"'
fewer persons will be familiar with the record unless the business fre-
quently produces a printout and makes it available to personnel.
IV. COMPUTER PRINTOUTS AND THE BusINEss
RECoRDS EXCEPTION
A. Conceptual Problems Presented by Computer Printouts
It is clear from the foregoing comparison of a traditional and a com-
puter recordkeeping system that the latter is a hybrid process different
from the former. 20 Consequently, a computer printout poses a set of
problems not common to a traditional recordkeeping system. The result
is that the statutory foundation requirements developed for testing the
reliability of traditional business records are inadequate when applied
to computer printouts.
First, it is simpler deliberately to alter a computer printout than a
traditional record since false data can easily be fed into memory.' 21
Neither the "business" nor the "regularity" requirements required by
statute are effective to ensure that the data base, and thus the printout,
has not been altered. Therefore, unless a court imposes foundation
requirements specifically developed to test the reliability of the data
base, the chance of admitting a printout containing falsified information
increases significantly.' 2'
then performs data processing services on a fee basis for customers. Thus, the customer
has his records processed by computer even though he does not own or lease one. Telex
Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 273 (N.D. Okla.
1973), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). See also State v. Hodgeson, 305 So.2d 421 (La.
1974).
116. Note, supra note 6, at 1035. The form of a computer printout should not de-
tract from its reliability simply because it differs from that of a traditional record.
Annot., supra note 1, at 300.
117. See generally E. SPmLER, supra note 110.
118. See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
120. See authorities cited note 106 supra.
121. Mills, Lincoln & Langhead, supra note 6, at 17.
122. One commentator argues that audits by an independent agent may be necessary,
[Vol. 1977:59
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Second, the difficulty of detecting falsification exacerbates the prob-
lem. Since a computer recordkeeping system involves little human
participation and produces no intermediate records, 123 a person can fal-
sify the data base and leave few traces of his activity.1 24  The "busi-
ness" and the "regularity" requirements do not improve a court's ability
to detect tampering with a printout. A foundation requirement that
a record be kept "in the ordinary course of business" will neither in-
crease human input into the process nor create intermediate records
explaining the source of the record's information.
Third, statutory foundation requirements have been devised to probe
the reliability of a unitary recordkeeping system such as the traditional
manual process. 2 5  A correct analysis of a computer recordkeeping
system, however, would consider separately the input procedures, the
data base, and the processing program because each raises a different set
of problems. Input procedures and the data base are appropriate sub-
jects within the purvey of the hearsay rule because their reliability can
only be proven by circumstantial evidence.' 26  A computer program-
mer can by expert testimony, however, verify the reliability of a pro-
cessing program.
Fourth, a computer recordkeeping system raises two false prob-
lems-that is, issues that apparently bear on the reliability of the com-
puter printout, but actually do not. First, the reliability of the hard-
ware per se is irrelevant. Although it has a reputation for making
Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs, supra note 12, at 913, while an-
other critic maintains that there should be restricted access to the hardware along with
periodic compilation of the records, Note, supra note 6, at 1035.
123. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
124. Annot., supra note 1, at 299. Bernacchi and Larsen state:
Thus, we have gone from a situation in which many illegal or questionable
practices and activities could be discovered by examination of hardcopy busi-
ness records or computer listings, or by depositions of a staff of people pre-
sumptively available to perform certain types of analytical or clerical work, to
a state of technology in which a single business executive can engage in illegal
practices in the privacy of a relationship known only to him and his computer.
Bernacchi & Larsen, supra note 12, at 377.
125. Before the computer was used to keep records, a traditional recordkeeping sys-
tem consisted of ledger books in which entries were made by hand. See generally E.
SPmLLER, supra note 110.
126. For a discussion of the circumstantial nature of hearsay evidence, see Morgan,
supra note 14, at 177-81. See also Milligan v. State, 109 Fla. 219, 227, 147 So. 260,
263 (1933) (term includes all evidence of indirect nature); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
Lonas, 255 Ky. 717, 722, 75 S.W.2d 348, 350 (1934) (existence of principal facts is
only inferred from circumstances).
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errors,27 the computer is a precise machine.' 28  Consequently, it is un-
necessary for a party offering computer printouts into evidence to prove
the machine's accuracy. If the party shows that he did, in fact, rely
on the printouts, this reliance is sufficient.' 20 Second, the statutory re-
quirement that a "transaction be recorded at or near the time of its oc-
currence"'' 0 is irrelevant to determining a printout's dependability.''
Input procedures, the data base, and processing programs are unaf-
fected by the passage of time; consequently, their reliability remains
constant as long as they are not tampered with.
Finally, courts are unfamiliar with, if not afraid of, the computer a3 2
Although this attitude will eventually fade as computers become a more
commonplace part of everyday life, at present a computer is still a men-
acing device to persons unfamiliar with it. The effect of this judicial
wariness is that courts do not rigorously analyze the problems of admit-
ting a computer printout into evidence.'3 3
B. Case Law
The issue of the appropriate foundation requirements for admitting
a printout into evidence is sufficiently serious that it can determine the
outcome of a lawsuit."' Appellate courts grant considerable weight
127. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
128. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
129. Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs, supra note 12, at 913.
130. See language of the Commonwealth Fund's model act, quoted in note 55 supra;
UBREA, quoted in note 59 supra; MODEL CODE OF EvmnNcE rule 514 (1942), quoted
in note 61 supra; UNmoRm RULE OF EvmENcE 63(13) (1965), quoted in note 61 supra;
FED. R. Evm. 803(6), quoted in note 62 supra.
131. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1240 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974). But see People v. Dorsey, 43 Cal. App. 3d 953, 118 Cal. Rptr. 362
(1974).
132. Chief Judge Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial
Circuit correctly noted this problem in an early article on computers and the law:
"Clearly, a thing as mystifying and bewildering to the average judge as a data computer
is going to be viewed with an intuitive apprehension born of ignorance." Brown, supra
note 1, at 249. For an opinion reflecting a court's obvious ignorance of the computer,
see Ed Gurth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1974) ("Certainly, compiling and feeding data into a computer... would seem to be
as routine as could be imagined.").
133. See notes 134-85 infra and accompanying text.
134. For example, in a case involving the issue of tax evasion, a conviction may de-
pend on the ability of the Government to prove that no tax return was filed. See United
States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 226
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); United States v. Greenlee, 380 F. Supp.
652 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 517 F.2d 899 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975).
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to the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence and will not
reverse it absent an obvious abuse of discretion.'35 Therefore, it is im-
portant to establish clear, precise standards for trial courts to follow in
admitting computer printouts. In the limited number of cases on this
issue,138 courts have applied diverse standards, suggesting the complex-
ity of the problem.'37 Courts that have faced the issue may be di-
vided into two classes: those which have admitted the printouts without
directly confronting the question, and those which have applied the foun-
dation requirements before admitting or rejecting the evidence.
Courts in the first category have admitted the printouts either by
failing to discuss the issue or by relying on grounds other than the busi-
ness records exception. An illustration of the former is United States
v. Edick'3 8 in which the defendant was convicted of misapplication of
bank funds and making false bank entries.1 9 He appealed, claiming
The Government may need a computer printout to prove that an event did occur.
See United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969). A plaintiff may
want to prove the existence of a debt. See Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb.
253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
135. Shore Line Properties, Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chem., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App.
331, 538 P.2d 760 (1975); Drumwright v. Lynn Eng'r & Mfg., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 282,
482 P.2d 891 (1971); People v. Dorsey, 43 Cal. App. 3d 953, 118 Cal. Rptr. 362
(1974); Mahoney v. Minsky, 39 NJ. 208, 188 A.2d 161 (1963); Cantrill v. American
Mail Line, Ltd., 42 Wash. 2d 590, 257 P.2d 179 (1953). See also Note, Evidence-
Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs, supra note 12, at 913.
136. As businesses increasingly begin to use computers as recordkeeping devices, the
issue of the admissibility of computer printouts will become more common. In fact, the
question of admitting computer printouts has been termed "the most interesting recent
expansion of the regularly kept records exception." McCoRMrcK, supra note 13, § 314,
at 733.
137. Compare United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970) (Haynsworth,
CJ.), discussed in notes 138-41 infra and accompanying text, with United States v.
Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974), discussed
in notes 186-96 infra and accompanying text.
138. 432 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970) (Haynsworth, CJ.). In Sierra Life Ins. Co. v.
First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 85 N.M. 409, 512 P.2d 1245 (1973), the foundation for the
admission of a computer listing of insurance policies consisted solely of the testimony
of a former officer of the offeror who testified that "the computer print-out [sic] was
the listing of policies. . . ' Solely on the basis of this'testimony, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the computer listing. Id. at
412, 512 P.2d at 1248-49. In Del Monte Corp. v. Stark & Son Wholesale, 474 S.W.2d
854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971), the trial court failed to require any foundation for admitting
into evidence exhibits ever produced by plaintiff's computer. Nevertheless, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at 856-57.'
139. United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350, 351 (4th Cir.-1970) (Haynsworth, CJ.).
Defendant was manager of the proof department of a corporation that was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a bank holding company. The department handled the bookkeepingWashington University Open Scholarship
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error in the introduction of computer printouts and master tapes.1 0 In
affirming defendant's conviction, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
"[t]hese exhibits are admissible under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1732(a) [the Federal Business Records Act] as business records." 141
Judge Haynsworth's one line characterization of a computer printout
and master tape as ordinary business records overlooks the conceptual
problems posed by the former. The result is an inadequate opinion.
It is more common, however, for an appellate court in this category
to discover other grounds on which to uphold the lower court's decision
to admit the printouts.14 2 In United States v. Fendley, 48 the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed defendant's conviction for tax evasion and filing a false
tax return despite its finding that the "Government failed to completely
lay a proper foundation for the admission of the evidence [referring to
computer printouts]." 14 4 The court reached this position by deciding
that defendant's objection at trial was "loosely formulated and im-
precise," so that
[t]here was no objection on the only grounds which would have per-
mitted the trial court to have required that a fuller foundation be laid
for the admission of the exhibit-that the printout was made and kept
for the member banks. Because of his position as manager, defendant was able to mis-
apply the bank's funds to his own account. Id. at 351-52.
140. Id. at 354.
141. Id.
142. For example, in People v. Dorsey, 43 Cal. App. 3d 953, 118 Cal. Rptr. 362
(1974), defendant was convicted of two counts of issuing insufficient checks. On appeal,
he argued that no proper foundation, as required by the business records exception, had
been laid for admitting the bank's computerized records. The court rejected this argu-
ment, distinguishing computerized bank statements from ordinary business records be-
cause the former are prepared daily. Id. at 960, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 367. This argument
is unpersuasive: computerized bank statements are not distinguishable from other busi-
ness records because they are prepared daily. See also United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d
226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (computer printouts from IRS Na-
tional Computer Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia, are self-authenticating); Regents
of Univ. of Colo. v. K.D.I. Precision Prod., Inc., 488 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1973) (com-
puter printouts admissible as summary); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. C.M. Golde, 190
N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 1971) (computer printouts held admissible as photostatic copy of
original documents).
143. 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975). For other cases involving computer printouts
and tax evasion, see United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 892 (1975); United States v. Greenlee, 380 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a]f'd,
517 F.2d 899 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975).
144. 522 F.2d at 186. Defendant and certain employees devised a scheme to induce
their employer, Western Life Insurance Company, to pay them commissions on sham
policies of insurance. Id. at 183.
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in the regular course of business, for regular business purposes and relied
upon by the business .... 145
The court also dismissed defendant's contention that introducing the
evidence without proper foundation was clear error because "computer
evidence is [not] so intrinsically unreliable as to make its introduc-
tion clear error."'140 Judge Godbold dissented, arguing that the "prose-
cution's failure [to lay a satisfactory foundation] should not be salvaged
at the appellate level by the palliative that there was an insufficient
objection."'u 7 He would, however, have applied the same traditional
foundation requirements as the majority to determine the admissibility
of the printouts. 14  The court's reasoning is poor. First, as the dissent
correctly observed, the majority avoided the issue; second, both majority
and dissent treated the printout as an ordinary business record. Conse-
quently, this court, like the Fourth Circuit in Edick,'49 failed to rec-
ognize the unique problems presented by computer printouts.
The decisions in this first category-those that have admitted the
printouts without directly confronting the question-are uniformly weak.
They show two basic errors: first, the courts failed to apply any founda-
tion requirements, statutory or otherwise, to test the reliability of the
printouts;' second, had they actually tested the trustworthiness of the
computer records, the courts would have employed the traditional
foundation requirements. The first is inexcusable; the latter, although
unacceptable, may be accounted for by the courts' unfamiliarity with and
mystification by computers."'
145. Id. at 185 (citation omitted). In Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418
F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), the Fifth Circuit upheld the admissibility of
the printouts stating that "[in view of the appellants' failure to list any specific objec-
tions as to the accuracy of the printouts, we cannot say that the district court erred
in relying on them as the basis for its judgment." Id. at 670. See also D & H Auto
Parts, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
146. 522 F.2d at 187.
147. Id. at 191 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
148. The majority would have applied the traditional requirements of the business rec-
ords exception. 522 F.2d at 184 (citing United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 754 (5th
Cir. 1974)). Judge Godbold also would have applied the traditional requirements of the
statute to computer printouts. 522 F.2d at 187-91 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
149. United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970) (Haynsworth, C.J.).
150. The rationale for the business records exception to the hearsay rule is the fun-
damental reliability of the records. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. The
absence of a rigorous test means reliability will not be proven. The admission of com-
puter printouts without a strong examination of the record's reliability is a dangerous
practice. Roberts, supra note 1, at 279.
151. See notes 132 & 133 supra and accompanying text.
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Other courts have more thoroughly considered the appropriate foun-
dation requirements for admitting computer printouts into evidence.
Because of the inherent flexibility of the common law, courts in juris-
dictions that employ the regular entries rule are more free to fashion
special foundation requirements for computer printouts. 5 2 Courts
governed by one of the statutes must, however, adapt the more restric-
tive legislative requirements to the problem. 158
One of the earliest cases to allow computer printouts into evidence,
King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,'" was decided in
Mississippi, which still uses the common law regular entries rule.'" In
King, the defendant was convicted of affixing a false notarial certificate
to a deed of trust.'5 6 On appeal, he claimed that the trial court's ad-
mission of "computer sheets" to show the unpaid balance due on the
note was error because they did not meet the requirements of the shop-
book rule. 157  After reviewing the testimony by the corporation's
manager in charge of data processing, the Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed, reasoning that "the law always seeks the best evidence and
adjusts its rules to accommodate itself to the advancements of the age
it serves."'158 Thus, the court was not "departing from the [common
152. For a definition of common law by the United States Supreme Court, see West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1901). With this free-
dom to expand and contract the foundation requirements must be compared the common
law's historical adhesion to stare decisis, which has severely limited its creativity. Tap-
per, supra note 1, at 612. See also Note, supra note 6, at 1037.
153. Because courts are restricted by the legislated foundation requirements, their re-
sponse to the problem has been to apply the requirements with varying degrees of rigid-
ity. Compare United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970) (Haynsworth,
C.L), discussed in notes 138-41 supra and accompanying text, with United States v.
Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974), discussed
in notes 186-96 infra and accompanying text.
154. 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969), noted in 41 Miss. L.J. 604 (1970). Numerous
commentators have discussed King. See 2 JoNES, supra note 14, § 12:4, at 336; Note,
supra note 6, at 1041-42; Comment, The Admissibility of Computer Printouts under the
Business Records Exception in Texas, 12 S. Tnx. L.J. 291, 298 (1970); Comment,
Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Print-Outs as Business Records, 9 WAYX FORST
L. REv. 428, 432-33 (1973).
155. The regular entries rule in Mississippi is still known as the shopbook rule. For
a thorough, though dated, study of the rule in Mississippi, see Note, Business Entries
in Mississippi, 16 Miss. L.J. 266 (1944).
156. 222 So.2d at 394.
157. Id. at 397.
158. Id. Judge John Minor Wisdom of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Judicial Circuit echoed this language: "In today's litigation with its endless com-
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law regular entries rule], but only extending its application to electronic
recordkeeping."'' 9 As guidelines for the future admission of computer
printouts, the court established a three-step foundation requirement:
(1) the electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard
equipment,
(2) the entries are made in the regular course of business at or near
the time of the happening of the event recorded, and
(3) the foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources of
information, method and time of preparation were such as to in-
dicate its trustworthiness and justify its admission.1 60
These requirements are open to criticism. Equipment development
in the computer industry has been so rapid that hardware components
are constantly in flux.1" 1  Thus, the first requirement-that the com-
puter be "standard equipment"-is unhelpful in determining the relia-
bility of the machinery. The reliability of computer hardware is a false
problem that can be resolved by requiring the offeror to show that he
did, in fact, rely on the equipment.' 62
The second requirement merely restates the traditional foundation re-
quirements. 0 3 Therefore, it fails 1) to test whether the information
fed into the computer was accurate and, 2) to distinguish between the
data base and the processing program and test the reliability of each.
that a court instituted with all of the power the organic constitution could invest in it
would have to stand helpless in the face of a new situation." Dallas County v. Com-
mercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 1961) (footnote omitted).
Accoyd, Brown, supra note 1, at 248.
159. 222 So. 2d at 398. Two factors influenced the court to admit the printouts into
evidence. First, commercial expediency was an important consideration; the court noted
approvingly the trial court's use of Wigmore's famous statement. Id. (quoting 5 J.
WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAw § 1530 (3d ed. 1940)), quoted in note 65 supra. Second, the court ac-
cepted the reliability of the computer, 2 JONES § 6:9 (Supp. 1968), supra note 14, in
support of its position. 222 So.2d at 398.
160. 222 So.2d at 398. In State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1975), the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court adopted these rules as its own. Id. at 428.
161. Today, for example, a mainframe computer may have plugged into it numerous
peripheral devices that have been developed at different times by different companies.
See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 270 (N.D.
Okla. 1973), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
162. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
163. Accord, Note, supra note 6, at 1041. For a discussion of the traditional foun-
dation requirements, see notes 53-74 supra and accompanying text.
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The'third requirement is too broadly phrased to indicate what testi-
mony will satisfy the requirement. Consequently, more careful articu-
lation of the contours of this requirement would have significantly im-
proved the guidelines. 164 Despite these problems, the King court's
willingness to create new requirements shows that the common law is
sufficiently elastic to allow the evolution of different tests of the ad-
missibility of a printout.165
When a statute has superseded the common law,160 courts have un-
evenly applied the legislative foundation requirements. Some courts
have freely upheld the discretion of the trial court to admit computer
printouts, 6 7 while others have rigorously applied the statute's require-
ments. Illustrative of the former category is Merrick v. United States
Rubber Co.,16s in which plaintiff's only foundation witness admitted
that, although familiar with the account, he had no personal knowledge
of the IBM equipment that produced the printout."' The court ac-
knowledged that plaintiff could have laid "a more meticulous founda-
tion" but still upheld the admission of the evidence. 170  The court em-
phasized "that portion of [the Arizona Business Records Rule] which
calls for the opinion of the court as to [the record's] admissibility.'1 7'
This decision vests excessive discretion in the trial court. 72  First,
the appellate court failed to set precise standards to guide the trial court
in admitting or rejecting the evidence. Without specific standards a
trial court is likely to apply the traditional statutory foundation require-
ments with which it is most familiar, although they are ineffective tests
164. One commentator argues that the broad phrasing of this requirement is prefer-
able because it "is flexible enough in its wording, yet clear enough in its intent, to be
of great value to the courts." Note, supra note 6, at 1042. Accord, Tapper, supra note
1, at 578-79.
165. Tapper, supra note 1, at 613-14; Note, supra note 6, at 1047.
166. For a listing of the jurisdictions and the particular statute regulating the business
records exception which each has enacted, see 5 WiGMORE, supra note 13, § 1561(a),
at 493-97.
167. See Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 85 N.M. 409, 512 P.2d 1245
(1973). But see People v. Gauer, 7 Ill. App. 3d 512, 288 N.E.2d 24 (1972).
168. 7 Ariz. App. 433, 440 P.2d 314 (1968).
169. Id. at 435, 440 P.2d at 316.
170. Id. at 436, 440 P.2d at 317. The court compared the foundation laid in this
case with that laid in Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871
(1965), discussed in notes 177-85 infra and accompanying text.
171. 7 Ariz. App. at 435, 440 P.2d at 316.
172. But see Comment, The Admissibility of Computer Printouts under the Business
Records Exception in Texas, supra note 154, at 298.
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of the reliability of a computer record.173  Second, even thoughstat-
utes do entrust the trial court with authority to determine the admis-
sibility of evidence, 174 appellate courts should still subject lower court
decisions involving the admissibility of computer printouts to rigorous
review' 5 since trial courts are unfamiliar with the problems they
present. 70
The first case to admit computer printouts, Transport Indemnity Co.
v. Seib,17 7 exemplifies a vigorous application of the legislative founda-
tion requirements.17 8 In Seib, an insurance company sued its insured
to recover for premiums owed on a retrospective insurance policy.'7 9
To prove the amount of premiums due, plaintiff introduced computer
printouts showing the amount of defendant's debt.180 In testimony
that consumed 141 pages of the record, plaintiff's director of account-
173. See notes 120-31 supra and accompanying text.
174. Both UBREA, quoted in note 59 supra, and UNIFOam RuLE oF EVIDENCE 63
(13) (1965), quoted in note 61 supra, by their express wording vest considerable discre-
tion in the trial court to admit or reject the evidence.
175. Tapper defends the appellate court decisions by finding the discretion to be
vested in the trial court by the statute. Tapper, supra note 1, at 599-600. Vigorous
appellate review of the reliability of the printout is necessary, however, before it is ad-
mitted into evidence. Without adequate judicial review falsified or unreliable printouts
may be admitted into evidence. See United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895
(9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring):
In a day when the pace of our technology threatens to exceed the development
of rules for human conduct, we must be careful to insure that fundamental
rights are not surrendered to the calculations of machines . . . . Therefore,
it is essential that the trial court be convinced of the trustworthiness of the
particular records before admitting them into evidence.
Accord, Roberts, supra note 1, at 279.
176. See notes 132 & 133 supra and accompanying text.
177. 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965), noted in Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1377
(1967).
178. For another decision in which a court rigorously applied the statutory require-
ments, see Union Elec. Co. v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 494 S.W.2d 309
(Mo. 1973). Most courts, however, have applied the statutory requirements with less
than a complete analysis. See, e.g., United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th
Cir. 1969); D & H Auto Parts v. Ford Marketing Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); Nelson Weaver Mortgage Co. v. Dover Elevator Co., 283 Ala. 324, 216 So. 2d
716 (1968); State v. Springer, 283 N.C. 627, 197 S.E.2d 530 (1973).
179. Defendant operated a fleet of trucks under a retrospective insurance policy is-
sued by plaintiff. Under such a policy defendant pays an advance premium. The in-
sured pays for damages up to a specified amount, and the insurer pays any excess. If the
advance premiums exceed the losses, the defendant gets a refund; if they are less, he
is obligated to pay the balance. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 254-55,
132 N.W.2d 871, 873 (1965).
180. Id.
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ing described the plaintiff's recordkeeping procedures-giving a full
explanation of each entry, computing it individually, and reconciling it
with the computer-produced results. 81
After reviewing the record, the Nebraska Supreme Court found: 1)
the printouts were bookkeeping records made in the regular course of
business; 2) the identification and mode of preparation were fully veri-
fied; and, 3) "[a] complete and comprehensive explanation of its
meaning and 'identity' were [sic] given."'' 82 The court upheld the
introduction of the printouts, noting that defendant's objections related
to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.1 88
The Seib decision is questionable precedent for four reasons.1 84
First, judicial economy dictates that a less burdensome method of
proving printouts be employed than having a witness recompute every
entry by hand. Second, businesses often do not keep the forms from
which the information is taken and fed into the computer, so that re-
creation of the computer record is not possible. Third, if the business
does retain the forms, computer-maintained records are often so exten-
sive that they cannot be calculated by hand. 85 Fourth, if it is nec-
essary to recreate the printouts by hand to have them admitted into evi-
dence, there is no reason to maintain records by computer.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Russo'"0 is the most
creative application of the traditional foundation requirements. Defen-
dant, an osteopathic physician, was convicted of mail fraud in a scheme
to bilk Blue Shield of Michigan by filing claims for unperformed ser-
vices. 18 7  On appeal, defendant objected to the introduction of a com-
181. For a discussion of the case by plaintiff's counsel and selected excerpts of the
witness' testimony, see Perry, Computer Records as Evidence of Insurance Premiums
Due, TRIAL LAwym's GumE 288 (1967). A board was set up in the courtroom, and
the witness took every claim on the list and reconciled it by hand computations with
the computer's figures. Id. at 292.
182. Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 258, 132 N.W.2d 871, 874 (1965).
183. A record once admitted into evidence is not conclusive; the trier of fact must
determine the weight of the evidence. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958); Seco, Inc. v. Gauvey Rig & Trucking Co,, 166 N.W.
2d 397 (N.D. 1969); Coulter v. State, 494 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
184. But see Comment, supra note 72, at 689 (arguing that "the decision is sound").
185. It is the computer's ability to digest and process quickly large amounts of infor-
mation that makes it so helpful in maintaining business records. See note 6 supra and
accompanying text. Consequently, businesses that are today using computers are the
larger corporations with extensive records to maintain. See note 105 supra.
186. 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974).
187. Id. at 1231.
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puter printout produced by Blue Shield. 188 At trial two witnesses had
provided foundation testimony: the first outlined the company's data
input procedures; the second, a corporate vice-president, described the
computer equipment, the verification procedures for the accuracy of the
input data, and the testing of processing programs for precision.189
After noting "the extent to which businesses today depend on com-
puters for a myriad of functions," the court found that the printouts
were reliable because: 1) the input data was accurate; 2) the reliability
of the output data was verified; and, 3) the reliability of the equipment
was not in question.19° The court rejected defendant's contention that
the district court should not have received the evidence because it was
not prepared at or near the time of the transaction. The court found
that a record of the payment was made on magnetic tape at the time
of each transaction, and "[iut would restrict the admissibility of computer-
ized records too severely to hold that the computer product, as well as
the input on which it is based, must be produced at or within a rea-
sonable time after each act or transaction to which it relates."'' g
The Russo decision is an excellent analysis of the conceptual prob-
lems presented by computer printouts. The court correctly required
separate verification of the input procedures and the processing pro-
gram. 1 2  The two witnesses gave expert testimony detailing proce-
dures employed by the company to ensure the accuracy of the input
information and the reliability of the processing program. The court
correctly rejected defendant's timeliness argument: unless there has
been tampering with the input procedures, data base, or processing
programs, the time of preparation of the printout is irrelevant to its re-
liability.'93 The court's finding that the hardware was reliable since
"[nlo evidence was introduced which put [it] in question" is un-
fortunate for two reasons. 94 First, requiring the objecting party to
prove the equipment's unreliability incorrectly shifts the burden of
proof from the offeror.195 Second, the best test of the trustworthiness
188. Id. at 1239.
189. Id. at 1233-35.
190. Id. at 1239-40.
191. Id. at 1240.
192. See notes 125 & 126 supra and accompanying text.
193. See notes 130 & 131 supra and accompanying text.
194. 480 F.2d at 1240.
195. Accord, United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1969)
(Ely, I., concurring).
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of computer hardware is a showing of reliance on the equipment by
the offeror.196
This review of the case law indicates that the courts' application of
the common law and statutory foundation requirements has inade-
quately tested the reliability of the computer printouts. First, the courts
unevenly apply the statutory requirements. Second, even when ap-
plying the requirements vigorously, courts treat the computer printout
as a manually prepared business record, resulting in ineffective testing
of its reliability. Third, because courts are unaware of the unique
problems of determining the admissibility of a computer printout, this
situation will continue. Consequently, a statute tailored to regulate
the admission of computer printouts is necessary. 1
97
V. A MODEL STATUTE
Two states have passed statutes to regulate the admissibility of com-
puter printouts. 198 Additionally, Rule 803(b) of the Federal Rules of
196. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
197. Commentators and jurists do not agree that the existing statutes are inadequate
to deal with computer evidence. Brown, supra note 1, at 248 (statutes have "sufficient
intrinsic flexibility to permit their adaptation to this new form and type of business rec-
ords"); Roberts, supra note 1, at 272; Note, The Texas Business Records Act and Com-
puter "Printouts," 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 161, 168 (1972). Freed states that "[in most
cases, computer use raises the type of legal questions as in other areas of experience.
Existing rules and apt analogies provide sufficient guidance for their solution." Freed,
A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, supra note 1, at 16. Accord, Freed,
Providing by Statute for Inspection of Corporate Computer and Other Records Not
Legible Visually-A Case Study on Legislating for Computer Technology, 23 Bus. LAW.
457,463 (1968).
198. The Florida statute provides:
A record of an act, condition or event, including a record kept by means
of electronic data processing, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence
if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode
of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or
near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court,
the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to
justify its admission.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.36(2) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
The Iowa statute provides:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book, or other-
wise, including electronic means and interpretations thereof, offered as memo-
randa or records of acts, conditions or events to prove the facts stated therein,
shall be admissible as evidence if the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of a business at or about the time of the act, condition or event
recorded, and that the sources of information from which made and the method
and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trust-
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Evidence applies to "a memorandum, report, or data compilation." °9
In enacting these statutes to govern computerized records, the drafts-
men have chosen to expand the traditional business records exception
to include computer printouts without developing new foundation re-
quirements. This method does nothing to solve the novel evidentiary
problems presented by computer printouts. Because of the common
law's inherent flexibility, courts, like the Mississippi Supreme Court in
King,"I0 0 applying the comon law regular entries rule should be able to
devise new requirements, but they have not. Jurisdictions in which a
statute has superseded the common law circumscribe their courts'
flexibility by the language of the statutes. Perhaps, then, "the law has
got to be stated over again" in a model statute. 01 The goals of such
a statute are to ensure: 1) the accuracy of the information entered into
the computer; 2) that the data base has not been falsified; and 3) the
accuracy of the processing program. The following statute is suggested:
Section 1. A computer printout recording a business act, event, or
transaction shall be admissible into evidence to prove the
truth of the matters asserted therein provided that the of-
fering party shows:
1) that the input procedures conform to standard prac-
tices in the industry; and, the entries are made in the
regular course of business, and
2) that he relied on the data in the data base in making
a business decision(s), within a reasonably short
period of time before or after producing the printout
sought to be introduced at trial, and
worthiness, and if the judge finds that they are not excludable as evidence be-
cause of any rule of admissibility of evidence other than the hearsay rule.
Evidence of the absence of a memorandum or record from the memoranda
or records of a business of an asserted act, event or condition, shall be admis-
sible as evidence to prove the nonoccurrence of the act or event, or the non-
existence of the condition, if the judge finds that it was in the regular course
of that business to make such memoranda of all such acts, events or conditions
at the time thereof or within a reasonable time thereafter, and to preserve
them.
The term business, as used in this section, includes business, profession, oc-
cupation, and calling of every kind.
IowA CODE ANN. § 622.28 (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
199. Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is quoted in note 62 supra.
200. 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 154-65.
201. J. WIGMORE, WIGMORS'S CODE OF THE RuLEs OF EVWDENCE Lx (1942). Brown
states that "[i]t is not an overstatement to suggest that the law has a positive duty to
accomodate itself somehow to this irrepressible demand of the economic and social world
in which we now live." Brown, supra note 1, at 248.
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3) by expert testimony that the processing program reli-
ably and accurately processes the data in the data
base.
Section 2. Definitions.
1) A computer is any electronic machine that processes
information through high-speed calculations.
2) A computer printout is a writing in readable form of
the contents of a machine readable medium such as a
disk, drum or magnetic tape.
3) The data base is the information stored in the memory
of -the computer or in an external storage medium and
processed by the processing program.
4) A processing program processes the information in
the data base through a series of logical operations
to solve a user's problems.
The model statute tests separately the reliability of the input proce-
dures, data base, and processing program.2 2  The first section recog-
nizes the existence of standard industry input practices. 203 Requiring
the offering party to adhere to these practices lowers the probability
of entering incorrect information into the computer.204  The require-
ment that the entry be made in the regular course of business follows
the usual business records exception 05 on the theory that regular busi-
ness transactions are a satisfactory indicator of the reliability of the
input data.
Ensuring the reliability of the data base presents the most serious
problems in admitting computer printouts. The ease of falsification
and difficulty of detection make the data base the best target for the
computer criminal. The model statute attempts to circumvent these
problems by requiring the offering party to prove that he relied on the
data base in making a business decision within a reasonably short
period of time before or after the printout was produced. What consti-
tutes a "reasonably short period of time" would be a subject of ad hoc
judicial resolution.
Given the ease with which computerized data can be altered, this
section of the statute is not a wholly adequate guarantee of the relia-
202. See notes 125 &" 126 supra and accompanying text.
203. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 267.
204. Id.
205. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
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bility of the data base. On the other hand, as businesses increasingly
rely on the computer to keep business records,20 6 an exception for com-
puter printouts becomes necessary to permit businesses to protect their
legal rights. The proposed statute represents a compromise between
business necessity and the legal system's demands for reliable evi-
dence.20 7  Proof of reasonably contemporaneous business reliance on
the data base permits an inference that the data is reliable.
The third section of the proposed statute focuses on the means by
which data is retrieved. A computer programmer can verify by expert
testimony2 8 that the processing program is reliable and accurate. He
can read the program for errors in logic, and, if necessary, make a test
to ensure that it correctly performs its functions.
The model statute does not include the traditional requirement that
the "transaction be recorded at or near the time of its occurrence." 209
Although examining the recording methods may help to verify the ac-
curacy of the input procedures, such a requirement is unhelpful in en-
suring the reliability of the printout.210 The model statute also contains
no rule on proof of reliability of the hardware. If the other criteria
of the statute are satisfied, one can infer that the computer hardware
is reliable. Otherwise, why would the business rely on it in making criti-
cal business decisions? The business records exception does not re-
quire a party to prove that his bookkeepers meet the standard of the
profession;21 his reliance on them is an adequate substitute for direct
proof of competence. A similar rule should govern computer print-
outs.
206. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
207. Necessity and a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness are the basis of the
traditional business records exception to the hearsay rule. See notes 72-74 supra and
accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of expert testimony, see Comment, Expert Testimony and
Voice Spectrogram Analysis, 1975 WASH. U.LQ. 775, 778 n.15.
209. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
210. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
211. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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